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Difficult Dialogue:
The Oslo Process in Israeli Perspective
Avraham Sela

I. Preface

T

he Oslo Accords seemed to represent the new post-Cold War/
post-Gulf War era, which ostensibly heralded the beginning of a “new
world order” under American hegemony. The weakened Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Arab radical actors, such as Syria
and Iraq; the belief that the American-led capitalist, market-oriented
ideology had scored its final victory—best expressed by Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis; Israel’s vulnerability to Iraq’s mediumrange missiles and to American financial pressures; and the perceived
loss of Israel’s status as a reliable U.S. ally in a tumultuous Middle East
all seemed to have created ripe conditions for a historical breakthrough
in the long-stalemated Arab-Israeli peace process.
Indeed, the first two years following the signing of the Oslo Accords
were especially marked by international optimism, together with a
growing temptation to foresee a “new Middle East,” characterized by
joint economic ventures, development projects, and social cooperation, on both regional and Israeli-Palestinian levels. During this period,
Israel and the PLO seemed determined to cement their partnership:
implementing the Gaza-Jericho phase, signing the Paris Economic Protocol which defined their economic relations, and signing the Oslo II
Accord by which Israel would withdraw from all Palestinian cities,
thus transferring responsibility for most of the Palestinians in the West
Bank, in addition to Gaza, into the hands of the Palestinian Authority
(PA).
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This discernible progress, however, could hardly blur the significance of formidable obstacles, first and foremost the internal opposition, with which the leaders on both sides had to cope in the process
of implementation of the agreement. Despite the initial support of the
majority of Israelis and Palestinians for the Oslo Accords and for a
two-state solution, the factors striving to “U-Turn” the process became
increasingly determined to wreck the ship before it reached a safe
shore. The Taba Agreement (Oslo II) of September 1995, which signified Israel’s determination to make tangible concessions toward the
implementation of the Oslo Accords, and, seemingly, the realization of
Palestinian statehood alarmed the zealot opponents of the Oslo process
and convinced them to take decisive actions to put an end to it. The
new agreement collided head-on with core nationalist beliefs of the
Israeli right wing, risking not only the surrender of the West Bank—the
cradle of biblical Israeli nationhood—but also the division of historic
Palestine, thus burying the dream of the “Greater Land of Israel.” Similarly, it threatened the Palestinian Islamic creed of historic Palestine
from the “sea to the river” as an indivisible sacred unit for the Muslims
until the Day of Judgment.1
The means that the Israeli right wing and the Islamic Jihadist groups
employed to undermine the Oslo process were indeed different in
nature and direction, but in effect they perfectly complemented each
other’s actions and jointly contributed to the escalating tensions and
return to confrontation. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin on 4
November 1995 did not prevent the implementation of the Taba Agreement,2 and in January 1996, the first free elections for the Palestinian
Legislative Council and Chairman of the PA were held in the West
Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. These events, however, triggered both local and regional Arab militant opponents to escalate their
violent efforts against the process, thus deepening the doubts and fears
among Israelis concerning further concessions to the Palestinians. It
also led to the election of a right-wing government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, a devout opponent of the Oslo Accords, whose term
in office would be perceived by Palestinian and Arab negotiators as
dealing a death blow to the peace process.3
What began with a sense of elevated idealistic hopes and euphoria thus turned into a crisis of expectations and mistrust, resulting
in a dangerous stalemate and then a major eruption of violence in
October 1996. The collapse of the joint bilateral venture could not be
better illustrated than by the resort of the parties to a new model

106

Avraham Sela

of negotiations mediated by the American administration, instead of
hitherto direct ones. Growing concerns of the Israeli public over security—mainly in its individual meaning—in addition to the ideological
inhibitions, became a primary consideration in shaping Israeli policymaking toward the Palestinian “other,” regardless of the government’s
ideology. Finally, the culmination of the stalemate by the breakdown
of the Camp David summit in July 2000 represented a major crisis of
expectations on Israel’s as well as on the Palestinians’ part, leading to
an unprecedented scope, span of time, and intensity of violence and
counter-violence between the two communities.
Embodied by the long and costly al-Aqsa Intifada of the Palestinians against Israel, and the repeated failures to forge a sustainable
cease-fire between these bleeding societies before returning to negotiations, this crisis may almost have entirely buried the possibility of a
negotiated settlement between them. What these “lost years” and their
cumulative political, social, and psychological residues caused seems
to be even more acute: apathy, indifference, and apparent acquiescence in the continuing stalemate. Worse yet, there has been a growing
despair for a two-state solution. Instead, there is a reconsideration, if
not adherence—even among exemplary Palestinian advocates of the
two-state solution—to the idea of a one-state solution based on equal
rights between Jews and Palestinians,4 which is an idea the vast majority of Israelis perceives as tantamount to a call for eliminating Israel as
a Jewish state.5
Fifteen years after the euphoric days at the signing of the Oslo
Accords, Israelis and Palestinians seem to have acquiesced in the stalemated status quo and have lost hope for an historical compromise
in the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding the continued dialogue
between top Israeli and Palestinian leaders; despite the American
efforts—as indecisive as they were6—to inject new life into the Oslo
process via presidential visions, such as the “Road Map” of June 2002
and the Annapolis Declaration of November 2007; and despite the
efforts of the international Quartet (the U.N., Russia, the EU, and the
U.S.) to see to the implementation of the Road Map, it is the cycle of
violence and counter-violence, reactive rather than proactive policies,
and mostly chaotic domestic politics set by ideologically divided societies and weak authorities that determined the course of events that
led to this deadlock.
The collapse of the Oslo process is also represented by the need of
each of the parties to justify its decisions and behavior while rolling
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the blame for the failure of the once internationally cherished joint
project into the other’s court. The narratives developed by Israelis and
Palestinians alike offered each party and group the desired explanations to the existing stalemate and continued low-intensity conflict. As
such, these narratives provide a sense of validity to, and resonate with,
people’s lives, or are deemed a self-fulfilling prophecy. The stories of
the recent past thus become another layer in the parties’ accumulated
historical narratives shaping the upbringing of new generations and,
hence, constitute another obstacle for future conflict resolution.
Against this backdrop a balanced and studied retrospective explanation of what went wrong in the Oslo process is much needed. Rather
than weighing Israeli and Palestinian relative responsibility for the
deadlocked Oslo process, this essay scrutinizes the pathologies of this
protracted conflict mainly through the Israeli perspective and conduct
during the Oslo years.7
Much of the trouble undergone by the Oslo process and the crises
that had befallen it can be explained in terms of two main clusters of
reasons:
• The inadequate “ripeness” of the parties involved for an agreedupon permanent settlement of their historic conflict and commitment to see to its implementation.
• The structure, rationale, and stipulations of the initial accord of 13
September 1993.
In addition—and partly interrelated with the problem of ripeness—
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process suffers from serious structural
barriers at both the domestic and regional levels, all of which were
represented in the Oslo process. Moreover, unlike inter-state efforts for
conflict resolution, and despite the fact that the state of Israel was the
primary party in it, due to the geopolitics of the conflict and the distribution of Jewish and Arab populations between the Jordan River and
the Mediterranean, the Oslo process must be understood in the context
of ethnic conflict resolution, which tends to be extremely complicated
and thus rarely successful.8 It is around these structural factors and the
question of ripeness that this essay revolves.
This essay begins with representations of contending narratives of
Israelis and Palestinians, practitioners and scholars, explaining what
went wrong. The next section examines the state of ripeness as far as
Israel was concerned, followed by an in-depth analysis of the structural
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causes that played a spoiling role in the Oslo process. This section is
divided into endogenous and exogenous factors. The endogenous factors
refer mainly to the flaws built into the formal Oslo Accords, namely,
the envisioned structure of the process—including phases, timetable,
mutuality, clarity, binding conditions, and third-party involvement.
The exogenous factors concern the social and political environment,
actors and processes, discrepancies of power between the protagonists, and the impact of state and non-state actors at both regional and
international levels. This part also addresses the role of competing
ideologies and collective identities in shaping the parties’ behaviors
and political legitimacy for implementing unpopular political compromises. Finally, the article looks into the impact of the violent conflict
during the al-Aqsa Intifada on Israel’s social, cognitive, and political
behavior. By briefly examining the impact of the al-Aqsa Intifada on
Israel’s responses, I intend to further identify blockages standing in
the way of current or future attempts to bring about a settlement of the
conflict.
II. Who’s Fault?: Contending Narratives of Failure
Though the causes for the collapse of the Oslo process, especially in
view of its early hopeful stages, have since been debated by practitioners and scholars alike, they remain diverse and often represent
political inclinations.9 Indeed, Israeli and Palestinian narratives about
the Oslo process, defined by an Israeli scholar as “Rashomon,”10 represent a typical case of contentious politics waged within each of the
parties concerned, as well as between them, and shared by formal and
informal institutions and social movements.11 The intuitive response
of many, if not most, Israelis to the question “what went wrong?” with
the Oslo process would project the blame on the “other,” both external
and internal players, though their relative shares of responsibility are
by no means equal.
The explanations provided by the Israeli echelons directly involved
in the negotiations at various levels were quite diverse in their assignment of responsibility for the final collapse of the Oslo process and in
relation to the obstacles produced along the road. As far as public opinion is concerned, with the massive wave of suicide bombings in February–March 1996, the Israeli public grew mistrustful and apprehensive
as to the “true” intentions of the Palestinian leadership, nurtured by a
competitive media inflating the echoes of anti-civilian terrorist attacks.
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It was only after the breakup of the al-Aqsa Intifada, however, that the
majority of Israelis, including segments of the left, turned to blame
Arafat for the failure of the Camp David summit and the indiscriminate terrorism against Israeli civilians. In this narrative, he bore the
brunt of the responsibility for the failure of the Oslo process.12
Indeed, Israel’s main complaints in the 1990s focused on the Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens and the PA’s reluctance
or inability to prevent such activities, in violation of Arafat’s commitments in the agreement. Yet within the Israeli political system, views
differed concerning the necessary linkage between a cease of violence
by the Palestinians and continuous negotiations with them. With the
al-Aqsa Intifada, however, right-wing claims against the process were
ostensibly vindicated, leading to a more assertive anti-Oslo discourse
supported by politicians and top military officers. The new discourse
aimed at interpreting the uprising as another phase in a pre-planned
program of the Palestinian national movement’s war against the very
existence of the Jewish state. Commentators pointed to the PA’s textbooks issued in 2000 as an example of instilling hostility in the young
generation instead of fostering a spirit of peace with Israel. Despite disagreements among Israeli experts over the new Palestinian textbooks,
these claims succeeded in framing the PA as a direct continuation of the
pre-Oslo PLO rather than as a peaceful partner of Israel.13 According to
this approach, the Oslo Accords were nothing but a Trojan Horse—a
major PLO deception aimed at wrecking Israel’s fundamentals from
within by systematic terrorism, now defined as a “strategic threat” to
Israel.14
Consequently, those Israelis involved in the Oslo process were
charged with deluding themselves as a result of ideological disorientation, loss of vision, or eagerness to “score points” in Western—
especially EU—circles.15 Politically, the continuous Palestinian terrorist
attacks against Israeli civilians dealt a severe blow to the Israeli left and
to the Labor Party that had espoused the Oslo process. By default, the
Intifada bolstered the hardliner activist approach toward the Palestinians, giving the military a free hand more than ever before to employ
armed force against Palestinian citizens and armed men alike.
A similar distribution of incriminations was manifest among the
Palestinians. The breakdown of the Camp David summit and the eruption of violence thereafter seemed to vindicate the critique leveled all
along at Arafat and his aides by the Islamic movements and ultraradical leftist factions for accepting the humiliating conditions of the
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Oslo agreement. One of the systematic and eloquent critics of the Oslo
agreement was Edward Said, who, from the outset, held on to the view
that the agreement and its offshoots were disastrous and inherently
flawed, placing the brunt of responsibility on the American administration, the continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories,
and the “Arafatian autocracy,” with its ineptitude and subservience to
the Israeli government. According to Said, Israeli leaders, including
Rabin and Peres, had never intended to promote Palestinian self-determination and statehood, but to perpetuate Israel’s rule over the Palestinian territories, confining their autonomy to municipal matters.16
A more balanced approach is offered by the studies and polemical
literature that developed following the eruption of the al-Aqsa Intifada
and the collapse of the Oslo process. Indeed, just as the surprising
attainment of the Oslo Accords became a central case in peace studies,
so did the collapse of the Oslo process in early 2001. The intensified
violence of the al-Aqsa Intifada motivate scholars and practitioners
alike to inquire as to the causes of the failure of what once seemed a
historic opportunity to resolve one of the longest, most tenacious and
complex conflicts on earth.17 Many of the studies, however, focus on
the gaps between the parties’ positions and their current politics, with
only limited historical perspective. Or they fail to examine the Oslo
process through the theoretical literature on conflict resolution, which
has seen immense development since the end of the Cold War.
III. Insufficient Ripeness
To what extent were the Israeli and Palestinian communities ripe for
undertaking painful compromises and seeing to their implementation
when their leaders signed the Oslo Accords? To what extent did Israeli
and Palestinian policymakers exercise political legitimacy within their
own constituencies? Moreover, to what extent have they been ready to
deepen and expand the “official” peace by follow-up activities aimed
at building social, economic, and psychological bases for a “culture of
peace?”18 Have they sought to bolster and perpetuate a peaceful relationship by encouraging grassroots social and economic cooperation,
revising images and perceptions of self and other—“de-victimization”
of self and “de-demonization” of the other—and seeking reconciliation
through reformed narratives in the media and the educational curriculum? The decade and a half since the 1993 Oslo Accords clearly indicates that the parties have been insufficiently ripe for such far-reaching

111

Macalester International Vol. 23

commitments due to social-psychological cognitive reasons rooted in
their separate yet joint histories from time immemorial.
The concept of ripeness19 is concerned with identifying the most
appropriate timing for shifting from conflict to conflict resolution,
with or without the help of a third-party mediator. According to this
concept, the disputants might be ripe for conflict resolution when a
“mutual hurting stalemate” is being reached and when an acceptable alternative is in sight. Yet protagonists of this concept admit its
weaknesses: identified “ripeness” by no means secures the success of
peacemaking efforts, hence it has little explanatory use and definitely
cannot be predictive. Nonetheless, the state of ripeness enables thirdparty actors to offer enticing opportunities, ranging from mediation to
economic aid and monitoring the implementation of the settlement.
Despite the inadequacies of ripeness as a theory, it offers some insights
and research tools that enable us to better define the conditions that
make for successful conflict resolution.
The failure of the final status negotiations and consequent resort to
violence by the Islamic and Fatah movements definitely underlined the
parties’ unwillingness to abandon violence and resort only to peaceful
means. At a deeper level, it raises doubts about the protagonists’ level
of ripeness for a far-reaching and comprehensive settlement as envisioned by the architects of the original accords. Indeed, an examination of the process as a whole indicates the immense gaps between the
two parties, as well as political blockages, some of which were already
apparent in earlier phases of the process.
The progress attained by Israel and the PLO, from signing the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September 1993 to the Taba Accord
of September 1995, indeed indicated their willingness to shift from
hostility to cooperation. In retrospect, however, the Oslo II accords
embodied the peak of the Oslo achievements, followed by a constant
deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian relations, growing mutual mistrust,
and frustration at the other’s conduct. Above all, however, this deterioration was the result of varied levels of political opposition to the Oslo
process, from total rejection of any deal with the PLO to a pragmatic
cost-benefit approach prevalent within both Israeli and Palestinian
constituencies.
Netanyahu’s term as Prime Minister had an especially negative
impact on the Oslo process, although he signed two agreements with
the PLO (the Hebron Accord of January 1997 and the Wye Memorandum of October 1998), thus practically legitimizing the Oslo Accords,
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albeit grudgingly. Yet these agreements, by which Israel ceded to the
PA small chunks of land in the West Bank, were effectively redundant,
resulting from Netanyahu’s retreat from the original Oslo Accords by
insisting on strict implementation of their own commitments, especially on security matters. Adopting a tougher line toward the PA and
raising the cost for any further Israeli compromise was tantamount to a
retreat from his predecessors’ commitments to further redeployments
and final status negotiations. It soon resulted in a state of crisis necessitating ever more American go-between inputs. Indeed, these two
accords were effectively attained thanks to intensive American mediation and pressure on both Israeli and PLO leaders by the U.S. president
himself, unprecedented since President Jimmy Carter’s personal role
in the Israel-Egypt peace process. That Netanyahu could not fulfill all
his commitments to the Wye Memorandum and consequently lost his
Premiership clearly attested to the limited support he could secure
within his right-wing coalition, despite his tougher policies.
Examining the Oslo process along these lines and others, it seems
that it was the first Intifada (begun in December 1987), the Gulf War,
and the end of the Cold War that accounted for relatively ripe conditions for the resumption of the long-stalemated Middle East peace process. First, it was the Intifada that injected new energies into the veins
of the marginalized PLO following its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982.
It also put Israeli political and military echelons under unprecedented
moral and diplomatic international pressures and revealed their inability to end the Palestinian rebellion. The Intifada also triggered the
emergence of a new player in the Palestinian arena in the form of
Hamas, a militant Islamic-nationalist movement, which increasingly
challenged the PLO’s status as the “sole legitimate representative of
the Palestinian people.” By repudiating the PLO’s acceptance of a twostate solution in the conflict with Israel, Hamas claimed legitimacy in
succeeding the original combatant PLO and vowed to fight Israel to
the end, thus tacitly questioning the PLO’s legitimacy. The rapid development of Hamas as a popular religious movement added a dimension of urgency to those Israelis wishing to open a secret dialogue with
the Palestinians, first with leading figures from Jerusalem and the West
Bank and then with the PLO.20
It was, however, the end of the Cold War, in conjunction with the
Gulf War, which framed the scope and timing of the resumed Middle East peace process. The Madrid conference opened with unprecedented international attendance in late October 1991. Indeed, had
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it not been for the heavy American pressures exerted on the Israeli
government, it is most doubtful that the conference could take place
at all. Yet it was this diplomatic arena, coupled with the multilateral
talks, which enabled a gradual rapprochement between Israel and the
PLO-guided members of the Palestinian delegation, comprised of West
Bank and Gaza Strip residents.
It is noteworthy that Israel’s government under Rabin turned to
direct contacts with the PLO as a matter of need, not of choice—in
view of futile negotiations with the “inside” Palestinian delegation,
a narrowed parliamentary coalition, and an unfulfilled commitment
to reach an agreement on Palestinian self-rule in Judea and Samaria
within nine months of coming to office. A way out of this deadlock was
opened in the spring of 1993 after it had become clear that the West
Bank and Gaza Strip representatives with whom Israel maintained
negotiations were fully controlled by the PLO, and that an unofficial
secret diplomatic channel with the latter had reached an advanced
stage.21 Indeed, the adoption of the PLO as the official partner could
not be preceded by any preparation of the Israeli public for such a
dramatic change in Israel’s policy. Hence, the breaking news in late
August about an agreement between Israel and Arafat’s PLO came as
a shocking surprise to most Israelis, many of whom perceived Arafat
as a symbol of evil, bigotry and terrorism. Though this demonized
image was somewhat mitigated in the 1990s, Arafat was never invited
to visit Israel—not even to attend Rabin’s funeral—and it was only a
few days before the eruption of the Intifada that he attended a dinner
at Prime Minister Barak’s private home, not at his official residence in
Jerusalem.22
Indeed, from the outset only a slight majority of the Israelis supported the agreement (smaller than the Palestinian one), matching the
balance of right and left in the Israeli Knesset. This shaky majority
proved to be extremely vulnerable and its support of the government’s
policy was conditional on the process’s success. Under the impact of
indiscriminate suicide bombings by Palestinian Islamist groups against
Israeli civilians, the contradiction between political reality and promises for security and peace became difficult to settle, especially in view
of the unexpected cost claimed by Palestinian violence. The latter was
skillfully manipulated by the right wing’s discourse, which played on
sensitive chords of the Jewish historical memory of persecution and
insecurity. The right wing continued to hammer their audiences with
the codes of ethno-religious Jewish (as opposed to Israeli) identity and
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a commitment to the Land of Israel complete (as opposed to the state
of Israel). In the campaign over the Land of Israel, Jewish religious
traditions and authorities were instrumental in delegitimating the government led by Rabin and Peres, paving the way to the first assassination of a Prime Minister in Israel by a Jewish zealot.23
The negative impact of Palestinian violence on Israeli policymaking
culminated on 27 November 2000, two months into the al-Aqsa Intifada, when the Knesset passed a bill stating that it must approve any
territorial concession in Jerusalem by an absolute majority of 61. Given
the right-left balance of power in the Knesset, Barak would not be able
to win approval for an accord involving the division of Jerusalem, forcing him to call for new elections. Under the impact of mass Palestinian
violence, shared this time by Fatah, the new elections brought Ariel
Sharon to the Prime Minister’s office, indicating the burial of the peace
process for the years to come.
Unlike the total absence of the military establishment in the negotiations leading to the Oslo Accords, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
played a major role in the negotiations on the implementation of the
Accords, in addition to its role as the legal governing authority of
the occupied territories. Moreover, by virtue of being in charge of the
national intelligence estimate and possessing unique capabilities of military and political planning, Israeli Prime Ministers were obligated—in
the case of former Chiefs of Staff Rabin and Barak, even preferred—to
appoint senior military officers as chief negotiators with the Palestinians. This is not to say that the IDF necessarily played a negative role
in the negotiations, but that in view of its immense influence and selfperceived duties and responsibilities, it tended to emphasize matters
of policing and security, manifest mainly by the intensive employment
of checkpoints, searches, closures, and the restriction of movement of
people and goods. The destructive role of the military in the context of
Israeli-Palestinian relations, however, reached its peak during the first
months of the al-Aqsa Intifada.
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IV. Endogenous Factors
A. The Inconclusive Oslo Accords
The insufficient ripeness of Israel and the PLO for a comprehensive
and conclusive peace accord underpinned their approaches and conduct before and during the Oslo process. In retrospect, it seems clear
that the main weakness of the Oslo Accords was its transitory (twophase process with five-year interim phase) and inconclusive nature,
leaving open core issues on which there was a huge gap between
Palestinian and Israeli positions, expectations, and constraints. To circumvent this gap, the parties opted for a gradual process to establish a
self-governing Palestinian Authority, first in Gaza and Jericho and later
in all major towns in the West Bank. Negotiations on the core issues
(final status, water resources, Jewish settlements, borders, Jerusalem,
and Palestinian refugees) were delayed to the permanent status phase,
which were to begin in May 1996 and finalized in May 1999. In hindsight, this envisioned order of progress failed to grasp the tremendous
aggregate impact of uncontrolled Palestinian violence, repeated delays
in the implementation of agreed-upon commitments, and soured relations as a result of unilateral policies on the part of Israel.
The essential uncertainty built into the Oslo process about its very
ability to progress and reach the final status phase was what drew
most of the fire from critics, Palestinians and Israelis alike. From a critical Palestinian viewpoint, Arafat was seen as a collaborator with Israel
because he had not secured the basic Palestinian claims, primarily
statehood and sovereignty, the right of return for Palestinian refugees,
and an end to Israeli settlements.24 In a critical Israeli viewpoint, the
Oslo process risked emptying Israel’s assets without securing Palestinian consent over the permanent settlement matters.25
Indeed, the signatories themselves were not unaware of the inherent weaknesses built into their agreement, and would have preferred
a comprehensive agreement, defining clear objectives and timetable.
Reportedly, following the massacre of Muslim worshipers committed by a Jewish zealot in the Cave of the Patriarch in February 1994,
Rabin and Arafat themselves discussed the possibility of abandoning
the phases according to the Oslo Accords and moving straightforward
to the permanent settlement. Yet even though Rabin saw the logic of
such strategy, it was deemed impossible due to domestic politics and
narrowly based government.26
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Rabin’s perception that the Israeli political system was unprepared
for negotiations with the PLO over the core issues might have been
mistaken, albeit a clear admittance of political weakness. It is not clear
whether Rabin believed Israel and the PLO could reach an agreement
in the final status negotiations or how he envisioned that agreement,
although he apparently believed in the possibility of retreating altogether from it in case it did not work.27 This vague approach to Israel’s
primary concern of national security, apparently shared by Shimon
Peres, might better explain their preference for a gradual process than
their sense of political insecurity. The following years demonstrated
that most Israelis were indeed unprepared to accept the minimum Palestinian claims for full sovereignty and statehood, let alone their claims
over the Temple Mount (al-haramal-sharif) and the right of return of Palestinian refugees into Israel. Indeed, the Israeli public had neither been
prepared for an agreement with a hitherto sworn enemy, nor informed
about the real meaning of the Oslo Accords, which had entailed relinquishment of symbolic and religiously significant places as well as
established concepts of security.
In retrospect, the Israeli public possibly misinterpreted the real
context and rationale for the Oslo Accords, believing that it would
guarantee security and peace, due to the euphoric vocabulary vastly
employed in Israeli, Palestinian, and international discourses about the
Oslo process.28 Indeed, the vision of a process leading to a two-state
solution based on Security Council Resolution 242—with Palestinian
sovereignty and close economic cooperation between the parties—was
championed by Yossi Beilin and a few others involved in back-channel
talks that eventually led to the Oslo Accords.29 This concept, however,
was not accepted by Rabin and Peres, the leading figures in the Israeli
peace camp. Indeed, their policies in the years that followed their signature on the Oslo Accords represented a narrowly defined agreement
on a temporary and transitional process which would preserve Israel’s
overall control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, keep Jerusalem unified, and deny the PA any symbol of sovereignty.30 Hence, beyond
domestic constraints, Israeli policymakers from Rabin to Barak lacked
a clear vision of a final settlement or the parameters by which such a
settlement should be worked out, without yet considering the minimum Palestinian claims.
Additionally, the generation-long residue of mistrust toward the
PLO, and especially its leader and symbol Yasser Arafat, kept Israeli
leaders uptight and cautious lest any gesture or concession to the Pal-

117

Macalester International Vol. 23

estinian partner—from releasing prisoners to easing restrictions on
the movement of people and goods across the borders to further redeployments—would provide ammunition to their political rivals and
erode their public support. This approach dictated a measurable progress conditional on the other party’s “good behavior,” which gradually discredited Fatah to the Palestinian public. Apart from continued
unilateral measures taken by Israel in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (primarily the continued construction of Israeli settlements and
security obstacles to the movement of people and goods), a symbolic
example of this half-hearted policy was the reluctance to officially meet
Arafat in Israel, relegating him to border-crossing offices and treating
him as a high-level agent, not as a full-fledged partner, in the most
crucial effort toward a settlement of the Middle East conflict. Hence,
the strictly limited scope and transitory nature of the Oslo Accords
attested to much deeper constraints, even on the Rabin government,
concerning the minimal Palestinian claims, namely, a sovereign and
independent Palestinian state along the 1967 lines of the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. It was these constraints
and the absence of a clear vision of a desirable and possible settlement
that accounted for a hesitant and half-hearted approach to the PLO as
an equal partner in jointly forging a peaceful settlement.
Within its text, the Oslo Accords indicated that both signatories
adopted a conflict resolution approach, despite the absence of any
guiding principles by which the permanent status issues were to be
resolved. Judged by their policies, however, it seems that under Rabin,
Peres, and Netanyahu, Israel was in fact seeking conflict management,
with a vague idea, if any, concerning the final status of the occupied
territories in the permanent settlement. Only after the election of Barak
for premiership in May 1999 did Israel turn to conflict resolution. In this
context it is worth noting that the original autonomy plan, agreed upon
by PM Menachem Begin at Camp David in 1979, was not perceived by
Israeli governments as an obstacle to the policy of establishing further
settlements in the occupied territories. Moreover, Begin clearly meant
to claim sovereignty over the occupied territories at the end of the fiveyear interim period.31 Even after signing the Oslo Accords, Rabin and
Peres remained adamant about preventing discussion of a Palestinian
state, and refrained from briefing their aides about their visions of the
final status.32
In the Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum, signed by PM Barak and
Chairman Arafat on 4 September 1999, it was agreed that the two
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sides would resume permanent status negotiations by February 2000,
towards reaching a Framework Agreement on a Permanent Status
(FAPS) in five months (by February 2000) and a Comprehensive Agreement on a Permanent Status (CAPS) within a year of the resumption
of talks. Even then, however, Israel had not given its consent for Palestinian statehood or showed willingness to apply Resolution 242 to
the Israeli-Palestinian case (a principle Barak accepted in regard to the
Syrian case). The extent to which even Israeli policymakers, let alone
the public, knew where they were heading was also indicated by the
lack of “red lines” concerning borders. Israeli negotiators began by
suggesting 65% of the West Bank, then inching up to 91% (plus a 1%
swap) at the Camp David summit (July 2000), due to the firm Palestinian position claiming no less than 100% of the West Bank territory (or
an equally quantitative and qualitative swap).
Jerusalem’s future was effectively discussed for the first time in the
formal negotiations with the Palestinian side.33 PM Barak, who had
hitherto refused to allow the Israeli delegation to deal with the subject
(fearing the collapse of his coalition), agreed at Camp David to a division of sovereignties in the municipal area of Jerusalem, including the
Old City, as well as a horizontal division of sovereignty in the Temple
Mount (al-haram al-sharif), which the Palestinians rejected, insisting
on full sovereignty over the whole compound. The effect of Barak’s
unprecedented position on Jerusalem in Israel drew harsh criticism
from the right wing and, to a lesser extent, also from prominent Israeli
figures at the center of the political spectrum, including Rabin’s widow,
Lea.34
The issue of refugees turned out to be another insurmountable
obstacle at Camp David. Since 1993, the issue seemed to be of secondary significance for the PLO leadership. It gave Israel the impression
that the historic Palestinian claim to the right of return of the refugees
to their places in Israel proper had been abandoned, only to find out
that the Palestinian delegation ascribed to it a crucial significance. In
the final analysis, the postponement of negotiations on the core issues
to the second stage, that is after establishing the PA and boosting Palestinian expectations, had little or no effect whatsoever on the parties’
capability to show more flexibility in trading off assets of a symbolic
nature.35
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B. The Perils of Power Discrepancy
The built-in flaws of the Oslo Accords were particularly harmful to
the envisioned process because the Israeli-PLO agreement was signed
by extremely unequal actors. Israel enjoys an overall control of the
territories under negotiation. Along with formal discrepancies—their
different political status, experience, and institutional abilities—the
immense inequality of the Palestinian and Israeli military and economic capabilities has been beyond possible rectification. Notwithstanding the internationally recognized status of the agreement and
the immense interest of most nations in its successful implementation,
the text of the Oslo agreement failed to mitigate the huge Israeli invincibility (e.g., by referring disputed interpretations of the agreements to
a third-party’s arbitration). Even when the U.S. administration became
involved in the process as a single third party—often at a presidential
level—in the wake of the 1996 Tunnel riots, it played the role of facilitator rather than undertaking the role of active mediator.36
In practice, the power discrepancy allowed Israel to conduct a security-driven policy toward the Palestinians that was shaped by the military and security echelons. Included in this policy were restrictions on
the movement of people and goods (even within the Palestinian territories), curfews, closures, demolition of houses, and collective punishment, thanks to Israel’s strict military control of these territories
by land, sea, and air. Israel produced dictates and unilateral decisions
toward the Palestinian side, such as postponement of agreed-upon
target dates (especially of further redeployments and the beginning of
the final status negotiations). It also avoided or prevented the implementation of mutual commitments, such as the safe passage between
Gaza and the West Bank, in response to Palestinian violence. Finally,
Israel created “facts”—roads and settlements—on lands that Palestinians perceived to be theirs.
Indeed, nothing soured the Oslo process more than Israel’s vehement violation of the spirit of the Oslo Accords by a continued policy
of settlement in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.37 Under Netanyahu, this policy was explained as a necessary means to keep together
his shaky political coalition. Senior PA officials, however, perceived
the settlement policy as disastrous to their interests, and equally as
destructive as Palestinian suicide bombings to Israel.38 The main PA
response to frustrating unilateral Israeli decisions, especially the construction of settlements (including East Jerusalem), was to unilaterally
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cease security coordination, or the negotiation process itself, giving a
green light to the Islamist opposition groups to carry out their suicide
bombings.39
Similarly, the Paris Protocol signed by Israel and the PLO in April
1994, which included fiscal and monetary agreements, fell prey to
the huge discrepancy between the two parties’ economic capacities
and Israel’s military control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the
same time, Israel had agreed to informal financial arrangements with
Chairman Arafat that effectively supported corruption and frustrated
expectations for transparency concerning the utilization of international financial aid and institution building by the PA. Netanyahu’s
premiership was especially marked by unilateral decisions, the most
conspicuous of which was the opening in October 1996 of the Hasmonean Tunnel along the Temple Mount’s western wall, which triggered
massive riots and culminated in a confrontation between the PA’s security apparatus and Israeli military forces.
Barak, too, failed to respect the agreed-upon deadline of February
2000 for concluding the FAPS, mainly because he was busy trying to
reach an agreement with Syria. To rush the negotiations and bridge
the differences on key issues with the PLO, Barak pressed for a summit with Arafat and President Clinton. This decision proved hasty and
insufficiently prepared, coupled with the loss of Barak’s parliamentary
majority even before going to Camp David. Yet, despite his far-reaching concessions on borders and Jerusalem, the proposals were rejected
by Arafat.
From an Israeli viewpoint, the expectations for building mutual
trust and cooperation were gradually frustrated by the Palestinian conduct. Indeed, despite their official recognition of the state of Israel
and acceptance of the two-state solution along the 1967 lines, the PLO
leaders failed to convince the Israeli public that they were trustworthy,
that they meant what they signed, or the truth of their publicly stated
willingness to live peacefully at Israel’s side and not at its expense.
Three main reasons combined to create this image of the Palestinian
partner: its unwillingness to confront the Islamic opposition by force,
its militant public rhetoric, and the PA’s corrupt economy and political
system.
Apart from short periods (March–May 1996, 1998), Arafat’s willingness to coordinate security policy with Israel fell short of Israel’s
expectations, being either insufficient or inefficient in applying his
commitment to prevent violent attacks on Israelis from territories
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under the PA’s full control. Indeed, Arafat’s primary concern was his
image and reputation among the Palestinians. This meant that during
times of sour relations with the Israeli government, Arafat acquiesced
in the violence perpetrated by Hamas and other Islamic opposition
groups or opted to buy time and peace with them at the expense of
his commitments to Israel under the Cairo agreement of May 1994 to
prevent terrorist attacks from the areas put under his control.40 Though
Israeli intelligence and security officials were occasionally divided over
the causes of this policy—objective inability or ill-will—it became the
most effective argument employed by the critics of the Oslo Accords.
As such, it was the main cause of the frustrated hopes and the loss of
the PA’s credibility from the Israeli perspective. It may well be the case
that Arafat perceived the continued Islamist terror attacks on Israel as
a necessary pressure despite its detrimental domestic implications on
the PA.
Especially under the impact of the terrorist attacks and the PA’s
perceived acquiescence or inadequacy in fighting them, Israeli critics
of the Oslo process repeatedly pointed to the incendiary nature of the
PA’s media and official statements as an indication that the PLO’s strategic objective to eliminate Israel had remained unchanged. A case in
point was the repeated Israeli demand that the PLO revoke those articles in its Charter that had tacitly or clearly denied Israel’s right to exist
(as stipulated in the interim agreement of September 1995). This was
even after the Palestinian National Council (PNC) had approved that
changes would be made to the Charter (on 24 April 1996) without specifying which of the 33 articles in the document would be changed.41 Following Netanyahu’s renewed pressures at the Wye summit, President
Clinton visited Gaza in mid-December 1998 and attended the PNC
session to ensure that the Charter was definitely revoked in accordance
with Israel’s demand.42
The perceived nature of a hostile Palestinian media culminated in
the heyday of the al-Aqsa Intifada as a direct result of the competition
with Hamas and an increasingly militant and revolutionary discourse
within the PA’s media, tacitly questioning the very legitimacy of the
state of Israel. Already during Netanyahu’s term, senior Fatah officials
made repeated statements to Palestinian audiences that explicitly or
implicitly indicated an intention to return to the armed struggle. Some
continued to use the slogan, “Revolution until Victory,” Fatah’s official battle cry. The tension between raison d’etat and raison de la nation,
termed by a Palestinian scholar as “national schizophrenia,”43 was
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mitigated during the al-Aqsa Intifada, underscoring that Fatah’s revolutionary and combatant spirit was still alive. Indeed, Arafat himself
made no clear statement to the effect that the “revolution” was over
and that the time had come to focus on building the Palestinian state
and silence opposing messages by Fatah’s senior figures.44
Finally, the political economy of the PA indicated a clear preference
for building regime security. It employed a number of armed organizations of police, intelligence, and preventive security, the overall personnel of which totaled more than 40,000 men. Whether this was part of
Arafat’s centralized political economy ensuring the PA’s status as the
primary employer or was genuinely needed for security purposes,
Israeli right-wing figures repeatedly pointed to the dangerous inflation
of Palestinian military forces, suggesting that its only rationale could
be to prepare for confrontation with Israel. With the Tunnel clashes
between armed PA personnel and IDF soldiers still freshly in mind,
the Netanyahu government insisted on a substantial reduction of these
forces and the arrest of those individuals wanted by Israel.45 This was
rejected by Arafat. The debilitating impact of Israeli security and economic policies on the deteriorating Palestinian economy notwithstanding, the PA became identified with corruption, nepotism, and a lack
of accountability and transparency in employing financial resources
(mostly received from international donors). All this, of course, exacerbated the negative impressions concerning the PA and its institutional
relevance.46
The Israeli grievances over the PA’s lack of enforcement of security
measures, the continued incitement to violence in its media, and the
failure to abolish the Charter’s articles denying Israel’s right to exist
all were brought by Israeli PM Netanyahu to the fore at the Wye summit held in October 1998. While the Palestinian agenda was topped by
claims for further redeployment in the West Bank, release of Palestinian “security” prisoners, and opening the Palestinian airport in Rafah,
Israel sought to reduce to a minimum its response to these demands
and render its response conditional on Palestinian fulfillment of their
commitments. Primary among Israel’s goals were the collection and
control of illegal weapons, the prevention of incitement to violence,
and a change of the PLO Charter.
The Wye agreement indeed contained a detailed security chapter.
The Palestinian side agreed to take all measures to prevent acts of
terrorism, crime, and hostilities directed against the Israeli side. Both
parties agreed to stop incitement to violence. The U.S., Israel, and the
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PA agreed to establish a trilateral committee to deal with the implementation of the chapter on security and the prevention of incitement.
However, although Israel did fulfill a limited military redeployment,
the process soon stalled due to strong opposition within the Israeli
government to the compromises made by Netanyahu at Wye, heralding the collapse of his coalition.
V. Exogenous Factors
A. The Politics of Identity
Historically, the Arab-Jewish conflict has been marked by divided
identities within and across national borders and sovereignties,
underpinning continued tensions concerning power and legitimacy.
Both Israeli Jews and Palestinians are part of larger collective identity groups defined as the Jewish people and the pan-Arab nation. In
both cases diasporic groups and larger identities tend to be involved
in shaping the politics, identity, and legitimacy, thus entangling policymaking processes and consensus making. Hence, as Edward Said
lamented, the signing of the Oslo Accords came without consulting the
Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan who had vested interests
in the agreements with Israel. Similarly, militant Jewish groups in the
United States defied the Israeli government’s willingness to surrender
parts of the Jewish homeland and Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem
at large.47
The conquest of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip
in the 1967 War brought all of historic Palestine under Israeli sovereign
authority, rejuvenating old and new longings for Biblical Israel, and
sowing the seeds of a messianic national-religious vision. Yet, while
East Jerusalem was immediately annexed by the state of Israel, demographical reasons forced Israeli policymakers to leave the future of the
occupied territories open, while effectively adopting a policy of selective settlement in them and establishing new “facts on the ground.”
The future of the occupied territories soon became the single most
important issue defining left and right and shaping Israeli politics.
The impact of Israel’s reign over the West Bank and Gaza Strip was
especially overt in the case of the National-Religious movement—an
historical ally of the Labor movement. In the late 1970s, the National
Religious Party (NRP) underwent a gradual shift toward militant, messianic nationalism, as indicated primarily by the continuous effort to
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settle Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza region. Together with the secular
nationalist Likud Party, the NRP aimed at preventing any future territorial compromise.
These ideological differences notwithstanding, effectively the policies conducted by all Israeli governments since 1967, of both Left
(Labor) and Right (Likud), on the issue of settlement were essentially
supportive of the settlers, motivated by a mixture of domestic politics
and traditional Zionist visions, on the one hand, and the failure to consider the Palestinians as a national collective, on the other hand. Thus,
despite the image of a deep cleavage between the pragmatic Labor
Party and the nationalist groups eager to settle as many Jews as possible in the West Bank, the steady increase of the scope of settlements in
the occupied territories reflected cooperation and symbiosis between
the state and its various civil and security agencies and the settlers.48
The peace process that followed the Yom Kippur War boosted these
processes of polarization in the Israeli-Jewish constituency, which came
to suffer from political paralysis due to the balance between left and
right, thus blocking any realistic option of a settlement over these territories, including with King Hussein of Jordan.49 The shifting reins of
power between the two main blocs notwithstanding, their equal electoral power until the late 1990s turned any decision in favor of a major
territorial compromise over these parts of Eretz Israel into a prescription for political suicide. Indeed, the consecutive shifts of government
led by the left and right in the Oslo years have underlined the narrow
room for maneuver of Israeli governments, especially under conditions of violence conducted by the Palestinians.
Despite his previous unequivocal and fierce opposition to the Oslo
Accords, in view of the stable majority of support for the Oslo process
among Israelis, Netanyahu had to adopt a compromise position. He
suggested that his party would recognize the facts resulting from the
Oslo Accords. Henceforth, the debate would revolve around the future
of permanent settlements rather than on the already existing agreement. In practice, he did not conceal his loathing of the Oslo Accords
as detrimental to Israel. He made continuous efforts to control Israel’s
losses by procrastinating on the implementation of its commitments.
This approach, coupled with imposing increasingly restrictive security
measures on Palestinian daily life and economic activities, eroded the
political posture of Arafat and his mainstream Fatah movement within
their own constituency and validated the Islamic opposition’s claims
against any deal with Israel.50
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The ideological polarization in Israeli society and politics was represented by the pervasive employment by right-wing leaders of symbols
and values defining Jewish collective identity in its antagonistic and
secluded nature. In their campaign against the Oslo process, the right
wingers showed little or no restraint, employing images of PM Rabin
wearing a coufiyya, the traditional Arab headgear worn by Arafat; associating the peace process with the Holocaust; and turning a blind eye
to extremists presenting PM Rabin’s image dressed in a Nazi uniform;
parallel to pointing to Arafat and his lieutenants as untrustworthy
thugs. While the Rabin-Peres government emphasized its commitment
to security in the context of securing the Jewish—and democratic—
character of the state of Israel, the nationalist-religious groups focused
on the security of the “Whole Land of Israel” and the “People of Israel”
as indivisible, emanating from God’s promise to his people.51
The discourse of the 1990s demonstrated the crucial power of values and taboos, and the debilitating effect of “non-Jewish” conduct,
such as collaborating with Arafat and arming his cohorts, partitioning
Jerusalem, compromising control over the Temple Mount, and freezing
the construction of (or removing) settlements, even if “illegally” constructed. Indeed, since the late 1980s, the perceived threat to the Jewish majority within historic Palestine (including Israeli Arab citizens)
was due to the rapid natural population growth of the Palestinians. It
became crucial in shaping public opinion and policymaking alike.52
This factor was apparently sufficient to mobilize most Israelis to
support the total disengagement, including the uprooting of the Jewish settlements—unprecedented in Israel’s history since 1967—from
the Gaza Strip in August 2005. Yet slashing 1.4 million Palestinians
from the demographic equation affected by the disengagement from
Gaza Strip has apparently reduced the acuteness of this problem and
its impact on policymaking regarding the West Bank. Nonetheless, on
his return from the Annapolis Conference (November 2007), Israeli PM
Olmert stated that failure to negotiate a two-state solution with the
Palestinians would spell the end of the state of Israel. He warned of a
“South African-style struggle,” which Israel would lose if a Palestinian
state was not established.53 At the same time, since the disengagement
from the Gaza Strip, right-wing groups have been waging a campaign
aimed at proving that the demographic balance in fact tips in favor of
the Jewish side, mainly due to decreasing fertility and growing emigration among the Palestinians and, at the same time, increasing fertility of the Jewish population.54
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B. Supra-Nationalism and Regional Linkages
A significant exogenous factor affecting Israeli policymaking concerning the Palestinians is the linkage with, and question of, prioritizing peacemaking with the Palestinians or with the neighboring Arab
states. Historically, the Zionist movement and the state of Israel prioritized peace with the neighboring Arab rulers over the Arab-Palestinian leadership, primarily due to practical considerations. As the most
immediately concerned party, the Palestinians were seen as an utterly
intransigent opponent and, despite ongoing contacts on tactical matters and one official attempt at reaching an agreement with their leaders, the Zionist leadership preferred to approach the neighboring Arab
rulers on matters of cooperation.
The establishment of the PLO in 1964 and the consequent systematic
guerrilla war against Israel by Palestinian armed organizations—in
the name of liberating Palestine as a whole and eliminating the state of
Israel—defined the PLO as Israel’s sworn enemy. The conquest of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 provided Israel with direct access
to Palestinian notables in these territories, but this leadership lacked
the necessary legitimacy to enter into independent negotiations with
Israel, especially under the PLO’s prohibition and threat of violent
punishment against violating its exclusive authority. It was only in
May 1989 that the national coalition government, with Y. Shamir as
Prime Minister and S. Peres and Y. Rabin as Foreign and Defense Ministers, respectively, defined the Palestinians—albeit confined to the
West Bank and Gaza Strip—as Israel’s main partner for a peaceful
settlement over these territories.55
Nonetheless, the built-in difficulties of reaching a settlement with
the Palestinians (let alone its implementation) have repeatedly tempted
Israeli leaders since the International Madrid Conference (1991) to seek
a quick breakthrough with an Arab state (Jordan, Syria, or Lebanon).
Such attempts raised concerns among Palestinian policymakers lest
Israel was seeking to prolong negotiations with them or shore up its
bargaining position with them through securing its interests toward
a third party. A salient example is PM Ehud Barak’s efforts to reach
an agreement with Syria over the Golan Heights and Lebanon (May
1999–March 2000) while holding back the fulfillment of Israel’s commitment to cede another territory to the full responsibility of the Palestinian Authority.56
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Regardless of Israel’s priorities, promoting Israeli-Arab peace relations has been, in theory and practice, dependent on progress in the
Israeli-Palestinian track. Indeed, the Oslo process revealed the crucial
role of the Palestine cause in Arab-Muslim states and societies. That
breakthrough encouraged many Arab states to establish diplomatic
relations with Israel or at least abandon their traditional policy of diplomatic boycott against the Jewish state. Similarly, however, the eruption of the al-Aqsa Intifada forced all Arab states to cease normalization
of their relations with Israel or cut off diplomatic relations with it. In
the absence of institutional legitimacy, continued economic depression, and dysfunctional bureaucracies, Arab regimes must reckon with
public opinion, which in the recent two decades has been primarily
shaped by the Islamist movements. The impact of growing Islamist
activism was especially apparent in defying the Arab-Israeli peace process through systematic public campaigns against normalization, thus
emptying the peace treaties signed with Israel of their contents.57
Despite the PLO’s impressive diplomatic achievements since its
establishment in 1964, the competitions among Arab states offered
the rival Palestinian factions myriad opportunities for asylum, financial, military, and political support in their struggle against Israel. In
the long run, these networks of patronage turned into a permanent
phenomenon in the regional Arab-Israeli conflict, serving Palestinian
opposition groups and their Arab patrons. Thanks to Libyan, Iraqi,
Syrian and—as of the early 1990s—Iranian patronage, Palestinian terrorist and “rejectionist” groups could play the role of spoilers of the
peace effort by strategies ranging from exacerbating terrorist attacks
against Israel to intra-Palestinian terrorism.
The main result of these processes in the Palestinian sphere was
the emergence of the Islamic faction Hamas as the main opposition
to the PLO and, since 1994, the Palestinian Authority. Without ignoring the significance of Hamas as a social movement and its practical
role in this respect, it is largely thanks to Iran’s generous financial aid
and Syria’s political and military offices that this movement has been
able to flourish and build a broad popular base. It defeated Fatah both
politically, winning the elections to the PA Legislative Council in January 2006, and militarily in June 2007, assuming a ruling position in the
Gaza Strip and threatening Fatah’s primacy in the West Bank.
In summary, both Israeli and Palestinian communities are stifled
by contradictory systems of beliefs—and identities defined primarily along a religious-secular dichotomy—but also by competing struc-
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tures and actors, both within and outside their immediate territorial
boundaries. The impact of this web of identities and parallel regional
networks of state and non-state actors on the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process is hard to exaggerate, especially given the Iranian and Syrian
motivations and the interactions with U.S. policies in the region, especially its war on Iraq. No less important, given Iran’s overt call for the
destruction of Israel and uncertainty about its nuclear project, Israeli
perceptions of, and responses to, Islamic Palestinian violence tend to
assume a broader regional context of security.58
V. Israel and the al-Aqsa Intifada
The failure of the Camp David summit was by no means the end
of Israeli-PLO negotiations, which continued until the termination of
Clinton’s administration in January 2001. Further international attempts
to continue negotiations were made, primarily Clinton’s final proposals.59 However, with the escalation of violence beginning on 29 September 2000, the prospects for finalizing a full-blown agreement faded
quickly despite the narrowed gaps between Israel and the PLO. Due to
Arafat’s reservations, disagreements remained unresolved, especially
concerning Israel’s claims to the Western Wall in Jerusalem as part of
the Temple Mount compound, and the Palestinian refugees—the two
most contentious issues. Similarly to PM Barak, Ambassador Ross, the
senior American mediator in the Oslo process, maintains that, “Arafat
was not up to peacemaking.”60
The scope of violence adopted by Palestinians and Israelis in 2001–
2004 was unprecedented in the history of their conflict, primarily in
terms of human losses. During this period, the Palestinians carried out
more than 20,000 attacks of various types, in which more than 1,000
Israelis were killed (70% of whom were civilians), and more than 5,600
were wounded. More than 500 Israelis were killed in suicide bombings, most of them civilians within the Green Line. The year 2002 was
a record high, with 60 suicide bombings.61 From the beginning of the
al-Aqsa Intifada in late September 2000 to the end of March 2002, 556
Israeli civilians were killed.
The terrorist attacks had a far-reaching direct impact on civilians, as
well as indirectly, defined in terms of high levels of post-traumatic anxiety and depression. The terrorist attacks were experienced by some
as an existential anxiety.62 The main implication of these attacks was
represented by growing militant perceptions and support of decisive
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responses against the Palestinians.63 More specifically, and in view of
the inefficacy of the diplomatic means, the Israeli public demonstrated
a growing support for a military solution represented by the popular
slogan, “Let the IDF Win!”
In the heyday of the al-Aqsa Intifada (October 2000–August 2003)
most Israeli Jews experienced fear and anxiety, along with a sense of
abandonment and hostility from the international community. In addition, despite the asymmetry of power relations with the Palestinians,
many shared the view that while the prevailing perception is that “we
are the Goliath and they are the David,” in actuality, the opposite was
the case.64 Hence, while most Israelis perceived Operation Defense
Shield (April 2002) as an inevitable act of defense against an unprecedented brutal wave of terror, world opinion by and large perceived
Israel as an invader into sovereign Palestinian territory and as a vehement reverse of the Oslo process.65
Given the weakness of Israel’s political echelons, it was the military
forces that dictated the parameters of the actual confrontation. The
eruption of riots in late September 2000 was met by an unprecedented
magnitude of fire power for which the IDF had been well prepared.66
Indeed, during the first few weeks of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the toll of
Israeli-to-Palestinian casualties was 1:20. Thus, despite statements by
the military establishment to the contrary, it would seem that the IDF
responded with excessive force, aiming to “decide the confrontation,”
which escalated the violence by triggering a strong sense of vengeance
among the Palestinians in an effort to straighten up this “blood balance.”67
Furthermore, while Mofaz, the IDF Chief of Staff during the first
two years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, strove to dismantle the PA and expel
Arafat from the territories, his successor, Ya’alon, preferred a strategy
of accumulating pressure on the Palestinians that would exhaust their
will to fight. In both cases, the government tended to follow the strategic outlines and operational recommendations of the Chief of Staff.68
The military’s freedom of action was further promoted by the Israeli
government’s decision shortly after the eruption of the riots, defining
the violent events as an “armed conflict,” unlike policing activity. This
meant a radical liberalization of the rules concerning opening fire, and
a decreasing commitment of the legal system to see to the implementation of the rules.69
Despite the long bleeding conflict in the years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the parties were, by and large, left alone, even when Israel recap-
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tured the territories under PA jurisdiction. Underpinning this state of
international paralysis was the Bush administration’s unprecedented
support of Israel, perceiving it as part of the post-9/11 U.S. war on terrorism. Hence, despite consequent visits of senior American officials
and envoys in an effort to stop the violence, a resumption of negotiations failed. When the idea of deploying international military forces
in the Palestinian territories emerged in the course of Israel’s Defensive
Shield as a means of stabilizing the conflict, Israel responded with allout rejection, perceiving it as detrimental to its freedom of action.70
The media played a destructive role in the implementation of the
Oslo Accords. The impact of the media was discernible already during the first Intifada. By inflating and exaggerating the significance of
the events, it exacerbated violence that otherwise may not have taken
place.71 A comparative study of the peace process of Oslo, Northern
Ireland, and Israel-Jordan concluded that the media played a destructive role by its tendency to operate with competitive considerations
and report immediately and dramatically, which ignored the vulnerable, slow, and transitory nature of peacemaking processes.72
The vicious terrorist attacks by Palestinians in the al-Aqsa Intifada played into the hands of those Israelis who had loathed the Oslo
Accords or felt ambivalence toward the Palestinian leadership. It
enabled the Israeli political and military echelons not only to place the
responsibility for the collapse of the Oslo process on the Palestinian
side, but also to explain the Palestinian violence as proof of Arafat’s
unwillingness to accept the historical compromise offered by Israel.
This line of argument, publicly propagated by PM Barak in the wake of
the Camp David summit, meant to rally the Israeli public around the
government and justify an anticipated long and costly confrontation
with the Palestinians. Asserting Israel’s moral correctness in fighting
the al-Aqsa Intifada, Chief of Staff Ya’alon typically defined the confrontation as an existential one: “[I]n terms of our righteousness [of
policy], today I feel much more comfortable fighting what the Palestinians create…[A]fter what we have been through in the last nine years,
I have less question marks and more exclamation marks. For me, a
moral clarity has been emerged.”73
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VI. Conclusion
The Oslo process demonstrated the rocky course to a historic IsraeliPalestinian settlement as well as the immense cost of the frustrated
expectations of the Palestinian people for statehood and sovereignty.
It also underlined the resilience and blocking effect of symbolic assets
and sacred values, even after agreeing on key principles and implementing substantive military, political, and economic steps. The Oslo
process shows that in spite of broad and intensive international diplomatic and financial efforts, local and regional factors played a primary
role in shaping the conduct of policymakers and the pace, direction,
and results of the process.
Neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian leadership has been equipped
with sufficient legitimacy or political power to handle the core issues
due to their “sacred” nature. Hence, the ambivalent and half-hearted
approaches by policymakers are revealed, especially under conditions
of uncertainty and delayed implementation of agreed-upon commitments. Nothing attests more clearly to the Israeli and Palestinian constrained decision-making than the continued violence against Israelis
on the part of the Palestinian opposition groups (with limited efforts by
the Palestinian Authority to curb it) or the continued Israeli settlement
in the West Bank and East Jerusalem throughout the years of the Oslo
process. At the grassroots level, there has been no serious discourse on
the core issues of the conflict and no effective attempts to educate the
public about the painful concessions they would have to make in order
to reach a settlement.
Under these circumstances, and aggravated by the huge gap in
material capabilities between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as
insufficient ripeness, a more determined international effort was necessary to cut the Gordian Knot.
The story of the Oslo process is an account of Israel’s escalating
resistance to conceding authority and control over the occupied territories and East Jerusalem to an autonomous Palestinian Authority,
on the one hand, and the Palestinians’ frustrated hopes for improved
social and economic conditions, let alone a rapid development toward
statehood and sovereignty, on the other. In retrospect, it seems that
Israeli policymakers sought first and foremost to absolve themselves
of the burden of directly governing the Palestinian population in the
occupied territories and, with the PA’s help, substantially to reduce if
not fully quell Palestinian violence originating from these areas.
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Clinton and his aides were originally content with facilitation, rather
than playing an assertive role and presenting their own proposals to
the parties, forgoing the use of the clout of the single world power.
When a proactive model was finally applied by Clinton, it turned
out to be too little, too late. As to the Bush administration, despite its
diplomatic efforts to resume the Oslo process, the “Road Map,” and
its declared vision of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, it demonstrated distance and passivity. Both administrations were overly supportive of Israel and lacked sufficient commitment to see to a successful
process. 
•
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